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Abstract
The regulation of genomic data sharing in Australia is a confusing mix of common law, legislation, ethical guidelines, and 
codes of practice. Beyond privacy laws, which only apply to genomic data that meets the definition of personal information, 
the key regulatory lever is the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) National Statement for Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research (“National Statement”) (2007). Compliance with the National Statement is a requirement 
for institutions to apply to the NHMRC for funding, and includes—among other things—requirements for review of most 
genomic research by Human Research Ethics Committees. The sections of the National Statement specifying requirements 
for research with human genomic data are currently under review, including proposed new requirements addressing the 
return of genetic research findings and oversight of transfer agreements. Ensuring the willingness of Australians to donate 
their genomic information and participate in medical research will require clarification and harmonisation of the applicable 
regulatory framework, along with reforms to ensure that these regulations reflect the conditions necessary to promote ongo-
ing public trust in researchers and institutions.
Introduction
The regulatory environment for genomic data sharing in 
Australia is a confusing mix of common law, legislation, 
ethical guidelines, and codes of practice. Some understand-
ing of the Australian legal system is required to better under-
stand the various ways in which this regulatory environment 
operates in the context of genomic data sharing. Australia 
(or, more properly, the Commonwealth of Australia) has 
a complex legal system, befitting its status as a federation 
comprising six states and two territories. Section 51 of the 
Australian Constitution specifies that the federal legislature 
has the power to make laws with respect to specified issues. 
Powers that may be of particular relevance to this topic 
include external affairs, corporations, and interstate trade 
and commerce. The states and territories have the power to 
make laws with respect to all other issues; however, where 
there is overlap between a federal law and a state or territory 
law, the federal law will take priority. The Constitution is 
silent on matters such as privacy, healthcare, and medical 
research, resulting in a confusing array of federal alongside 
state and territory laws for many issues relevant to genomic 
data sharing.
State and territory courts have jurisdiction to hear the 
first-instance decisions relating to common law actions 
(like breach of contract, negligence, and trespass), as well 
as their own legislative instruments, although the High 
Court of Australia is the final court of appeal. Decisions 
of the High Court on common law actions are binding on 
all of the states and territories. However, decisions of state 
and territory courts that do not reach the High Court may 
cause differences in the interpretation of the common law 
between the states and territories. One example is the lack 
of uniformity across Australia about the status of a common 
law right to privacy (Australian Law Reform Commission 
2014). Legislative differences among states and territories 
in a number of areas of law relevant to genomic data shar-
ing, including privacy and human tissue legislation, also can 
create challenges for researchers.
The patchwork of Australia’s regulatory environment 
generates implications for public trust. Regulatory gaps cre-
ate uncertain expectations as to how Australian institutions 
will protect the interests of research participants, especially 
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those from vulnerable groups. Establishing such expecta-
tions is a key precursor to trust. In Australia, the absence of 
clear regulation and cohesive normative expectations argu-
ably shifts the responsibility for protecting public trust to 
individual Human Research Ethics Committee (“HREC”) 
members, researchers, and clinicians. Fortunately, trust in 
these groups is relatively high (Bruce and Critchley 2015), 
but as the aftermath of biomedical scandals suggest, can 
easily be eroded. The potential implications go beyond those 
directly involved in the transgression (Dixon-Woods et al. 
2011), and most importantly, can result in restrictive regu-
latory environments that could impede scientific discovery 
(Gillott 2014).
Consent
Consent is an ethical and legal requirement for the collec-
tion, use, and sharing of much, but not all, genomic infor-
mation and samples. For genomic information that meets 
the definition of “personal information” under privacy laws 
(discussed further below), consent is usually required.1 The 
sharing of human genomic information for research is also 
governed by ethical codes, principally the National Health 
and Medical Research Council (“NHMRC”), and National 
Statement for Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) 
(“National Statement”) (Australian Government National 
Health and Medical Research Council 2007).2
Unlike, for example, the US Common Rule, compliance 
with the National Statement is not a legal requirement. 
Rather, the key regulatory lever is institutional funding. 
Institutions such as public hospitals and universities can 
only apply to the NHMRC for funding if they declare that 
all research which they conduct complies with the National 
Statement. In their 2003 report on the protection of human 
genetic information (“Essentially Yours”), the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) and the Australian 
Health Ethics Committee (“AHEC”)—one of the Principal 
Committees of the NHMRC—noted the extensive reach of 
the National Statement in governing Australian health and 
medical research, from direct provision of peer-reviewed 
health research funds and less linear connections. For exam-
ple, research funded through the private sector but conducted 
at publicly funded institutions would have to be compliant 
(Australian Law Reform Commission 2003).3 Non-compli-
ance with provisions of the National Statement by individual 
researchers, together with potential breaches of the Austral-
ian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (“Aus-
tralian Research Code”) (Australian Government National 
Health and Medical Research Council et al. 2018), could 
form the basis of employment proceedings, a professional 
misconduct claim or an action in negligence for failure to 
meet the required standard of care for research (for exam-
ple, Medical Board of Australia v Melhuish (Occupational 
Discipline) [2016] ACAT 29).
Consent requirements are captured in Chap. 2.2 of the 
National Statement, which specifies the “guiding princi-
ple” that “a person’s decision to participate in research is 
to be voluntary, and based on sufficient information and 
adequate understanding of both the proposed research and 
the implications of participation in it” (Australian Govern-
ment National Health and Medical Research Council 2007). 
Furthermore, “[p]articipation that is voluntary and based on 
sufficient information requires an adequate understanding of 
the purpose, methods, demands, risks, and potential benefits 
of the research” (Australian Government National Health 
and Medical Research Council 2007). The National State-
ment does, however, build in provision for broad and blanket 
consent for the future use of data and tissue in research. In 
particular, it notes that consent may be:
a. ‘specific’: limited to the specific project under consid-
eration;
b. ‘extended’: given for the use of data or tissue in future 
research projects that are:
1. an extension of, or closely related to, the original 
project; or
2. in the same general area of research (for example, 
genealogical, ethnographical, epidemiological, or 
chronic illness research);
c. ‘unspecified’: given for the use of data or tissue in any 
future research (Australian Government National Health 
and Medical Research Council 2007, para 2.2.14).
Importantly, the National Statement clarifies that “The 
necessarily limited information and understanding about 
research for which extended or unspecified consent is 
given can still be sufficient and adequate for the purpose 
of consent”. When unspecified consent is sought, research-
ers should clearly explain to participants its terms and 1 Under s 95A of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), a waiver of consent 
may be approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee for the use 
of personal information in research relevant to public health or public 
safety where the public interest in the research is deemed to outweigh 
the public interest in the protection of privacy.
2 At the time of writing, parts of the National Statement are being 
revised including on human genetics and the use of human biospeci-
mens.
3 Compliance with the National Statement also is a prerequisite 
for the use of unregistered therapeutic goods under the Therapeutic 
Goods Regulations 1990 (Cth) and for certain uses of personal infor-
mation under Commonwealth and state and territory privacy acts.
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wide-ranging implications (Australian Government National 
Health and Medical Research Council 2007).
The National Statement also provides for waivers of con-
sent in certain circumstances, including for some research 
involving human genomic information and samples. Before 
deciding whether to grant a waiver of consent, an HREC 
must be satisfied that it is impracticable to gain consent 
and that there is no known or likely reason that participants 
would not have consented if they had been asked (Australian 
Government National Health and Medical Research Council 
2007). Chapter 3.5 of the National Statement details specific 
requirements for human genetic research, noting additional 
ethical issues based on the familial nature of the informa-
tion and the potential for the information to provide pre-
dictive health information for participants and their family 
members. This chapter precludes researchers from sharing 
genetic material or related information in the absence of 
specific consent by participants or a judgment by an HREC 
that the provisions have been met for an extended or unspeci-
fied consent, or a waiver of consent (Australian Government 
National Health and Medical Research Council 2007).
Uncertainty exists, however, about the circumstances 
in which a waiver of consent should be granted (Otlowski 
and Nicol 2013). One common argument for waiver is the 
impracticability of seeking consent from participants who 
donated samples or information many years earlier. Yet, a 
2002 study reported having recontacted 1409 out of 1494 
persons who had donated blood for research purposes 
11 years earlier. Of these, 1311 (93% of eligible participants) 
gave consent for future research using their blood samples. 
The authors concluded that it is feasible to obtain individual 
consent for genetic research many years after donation, and 
that people are highly willing to contribute to such research 
(Stegmayr and Asplund 2002). Other researchers, however, 
point to the time that it takes for researchers to contact par-
ticipants, along with the potential distress that can be caused 
by inappropriate contact—for example, letters sent to par-
ticipants who have since deceased (Furness and Nicholson 
2004). In the absence of further clarification, it is likely that 
HREC positions on “impracticability” and other justifica-
tions for waivers of consent will vary.
The NHMRC has recently incorporated revisions to the 
National Statement, including an expansion of the ‘Human 
Genetics’ section (Chap. 3.5). The changes clarify circum-
stances in which specific consent is not required for human 
genomic research, being:
(a) if the data or information to be collected/generated/
accessed/used was previously collected and either 
aggregated or rendered non-identifiable;
(b) if prior consent was provided under the scope of a 
research program that encompasses the proposed 
research project; or
(c) if prior consent was provided in the clinical context 
for research that encompasses the proposed research 
project (National Health and Medical Research Council 
2016)
The changes also specify that researchers should not share 
genomic information unless such sharing is consistent with 
consent obtained either for the research project or for clinical 
purposes. Alternatively, an HREC may provide a waiver of 
consent where it considers that the requisite conditions have 
been met. Unlike present practices (Chalmers et al. 2014), 
an HREC also is required to approve any transfer agreement 
established for the sharing. These changes also include sub-
stantially more detailed and specific requirements for the 
return of genomic findings, including an obligation to have 
a process in place for the return of findings that are of proven 
validity and of health significance to the participant or rela-
tive, subject to participant consent (Australian Government 
National Health and Medical Research Council 2007).
Legal obligations to seek consent for the collection, use, 
and disclosure of genomic samples—as compared with 
genomic information—are set out in state and territory 
human tissue acts. Many of these are modelled on the semi-
nal 1977 ALRC Human Tissue Transplants report, which set 
out draft legislation, including consent requirements for the 
removal of tissue for “therapeutic purposes or for medical 
or scientific purposes” [Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion 1977, Appendix 4 s 9(1)(e)]. Expressly excepted from 
consent requirements, however, was the removal or use of 
any tissue “from the body of a living person in the course 
of a procedure or operation carried out, in the interests of 
the health of the person, by a medical practitioner with the 
consent, express or implied, given by or on behalf of the 
person or in circumstances necessary for the preservation 
of the life of the person” [Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion 1977, Appendix 4 s 44(1)]. This exception has been 
implemented and retained in most state and territory human 
tissue acts, permitting the use of such samples in research. 
In New South Wales (NSW); however, amendments to the 
Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) via the Human Tissue and 
Anatomy Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW) added a 
requirement for consent for the use of any tissue removed 
for clinical or other purposes for research.
Some research has been undertaken to investigate the 
wishes and expectations of Australians in relation to shar-
ing genomic data for research, particularly in the context of 
biobanking. For instance, a deliberative democracy event in 
2013 found participants to be broadly pragmatic, with a will-
ingness to compromise on their concerns to facilitate better 
scientific outcomes. All but two supported a broad consent 
model for donation of human tissue and data (McWhirter 
et al. 2014). An earlier project involving semi-structured 
interviews reported a willingness among participants for 
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donated specimens to be used “as the researchers saw fit”, 
and for waivers of consent for use of de-identified informa-
tion. Reportedly, participants expressed concern that more 
rigid consent requirements could stifle valuable research 
(Lipworth et al. 2009). Recipients of clinical genetics can-
cer care also have expressed a willingness to waive active 
consent for storage of their de-identified information in a 
research database (Forrest et al. 2018). These studies are 
consistent with the international trends on participant will-
ingness to share genomic information and samples for a 
broad spectrum of future research (Grady et al. 2015).
Researchers and clinicians involved in genomic data shar-
ing must also be cognisant of the potential for group harm. 
In Australia, this is of particular concern for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander participants, for whom risks include 
genetic discrimination, racial stereotyping, cultural under-
mining, or harms associated with defining Aboriginality 
through genetics. In recognition of these concerns, HRECs 
may require community or group consent in addition to indi-
vidual consents for genomic research involving Indigenous 
Australians. The NHMRC Ethical Conduct in Research with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and Commu-
nities: Guidelines for Researchers and Stakeholders recog-
nises that:
Decisions about participation in research may some-
times involve the whole community and not only 
individuals. Researchers may need to seek commu-
nity consent as well as individual consent (Australian 
Government National Health and Medical Research 
Council 2018a).
Concerns about the potential harms specific to Indig-
enous participants have led to the exclusion of Indigenous 
Australians from much genomic research (McWhirter et al. 
2015). This creates a problem, in that it limits the relevance 
of research findings to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
and risks exacerbating existing health disparities.
In sum, the requirements to seek consent for partici-
pants in human genomic research in Australia are primarily 
derived from federal, state, and territory privacy laws, as 
well as the conditions for ethical approval under the National 
Statement. These frameworks allow researchers to obtain 
broad, as compared with specific, consent for the use of data 
or tissue in future research contingent on HREC approval 
and an explanation of the implications of such consent to 
potential participants. Waivers of consent are also permitted 
in situations in which an HREC deems that it is impracti-
cable to gain consent and that there is no known or likely 
reason that participants would not have consented if they had 
been asked. The 2018 revisions to the National Statement 
will have the effect of better defining the circumstances in 
which specific consent is not required for human genomic 
research.
Privacy
Australia has a complex patchwork of federal and state and 
territory privacy laws. This leads to areas of both over- and 
under-regulation, as well as some potential inconsistencies.
The federal public sector and private corporations are 
bound by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (“Privacy Act”). In 
addition, most Australian states and territories have enacted 
their own privacy statutes to govern information held by 
their public sectors and—in some cases such as Victoria and 
NSW—private health service providers in the state. In South 
Australia, the management of personal information is regu-
lated through an administrative instruction (Government of 
South Australia 2016). In Western Australia, although some 
privacy principles are covered in the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act 1992 (WA), it applies solely to documents held by 
government agencies.
Under the federal Privacy Act, a regulated entity must 
not use or disclose personal information about an individual 
for a purpose other than the primary purpose of collection 
unless the individual has consented or another exception 
applies. Most relevant for the sharing of genomic informa-
tion is an exception under s 16B(3) allowing the use or dis-
closure of health information if:
(a) the use or disclosure is necessary for research, or the 
compilation or analysis of statistics, relevant to public 
health or public safety;
(b) it is impracticable for the organisation to obtain the 
individual’s consent to the use or disclosure;
(c) the use or disclosure is conducted in accordance with 
the guidelines approved under section 95A for the pur-
poses of this paragraph;
(d) in the case of disclosure—the organisation reason-
ably believes that the recipient of the information will 
not disclose the information, or personal information 
derived from that information.
Guidelines approved under s 95A of the Privacy Act pro-
vide a framework for HRECs, researchers, and others for the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal health information 
without consent. These clarify that, for the use or disclo-
sure to be considered “necessary” for research, an HREC 
must determine that “the outcome of the research activity 
would have an impact on or provide information about pub-
lic health or public safety” and “the relevant purpose of the 
research activity cannot be achieved by the collection, use, 
or disclosure of de-identified data”. Similar exceptions are 
included in most state and territory privacy regimes, with a 
number adding the requirement that the disclosure will not 
be published in a form that identifies particular individuals. 
Notable exceptions are the South Australian administrative 
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instruction and the Australian Capital Territory Act, which 
do not include a research exception from use and disclosure 
requirements.
The variation between federal and state and territory pri-
vacy laws creates challenges clarifying what law, or laws, 
apply to a given entity or activity. Most hospitals, research 
centres, and universities are established by state and terri-
tory legislation, making them subject to state and territory 
privacy regimes (Chalmers 2015). However, the practical 
realities of research funding and operations can complicate 
matters, particularly as the interface between research and 
clinical care is increasingly blurred in genomics (Berkman 
et al. 2014). For example, would a university researcher 
receiving private sector funding be governed by state or 
federal law? (Otlowski and Nicol 2013). Similarly, what 
regulations apply to research taking place in both public 
and private institutions?
In some states, private health sectors must comply with 
both state and federal laws, resulting in some potentially 
inconsistent obligations. An example is disclosure of genetic 
information to genetic relatives without consent. Under the 
Privacy Act, an organisation may disclose genetic informa-
tion to a genetic relative without consent in circumstances 
when there is reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary 
to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the life, health, or 
safety of genetic relatives, and the use or disclosure is con-
ducted in accordance with guidelines issued by the NHMRC 
(the s 95AA guidelines). In Victoria, private sector health 
service providers must also comply with the Health Privacy 
Principles set out in the Health Records Act 2001 (Vic). This 
Act permits disclosure only in situations in which the shar-
ing is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious and imminent 
threat to an individual’s life health and safety. Although an 
additional exception to the Victorian use and disclosure 
provisions where “the use or disclosure is required, author-
ised, or permitted… by or under law” appears to resolve this 
conflict, the inconsistency may still result in confusion for 
affected patients and researchers.
In the specific context of whole-genomic sequencing, 
there is uncertainty as to whether the information is “per-
sonal” and, therefore, subject to privacy requirements. This 
has not been directly tested in the courts. Under section 6 of 
the Privacy Act, personal information is defined as “infor-
mation or an opinion about an identified individual, or an 
individual who is reasonably identifiable”. Clearly, human 
genome sequences directly linked to personal identifiers will 
fall within this definition. Much less certain is the extent 
to which whole-genome sequences satisfy the definition in 
the absence of specific identifiers. Researchers have shown 
the potential to deduce the individual identity of some per-
sons based on their whole-genome sequences in combina-
tion with additional publicly available information (Gymrek 
et al. 2013). Although, at present, such approaches require 
considerable effort and ingenuity, along with the availability 
of certain genealogical information, their availability means 
that it is not fanciful for a court or a regulator to interpret a 
whole-genome sequence as being about “an individual who 
is reasonably identifiable”.
The 2018 revisions to the National Statement mentioned 
earlier impose some additional privacy requirements on 
researchers seeking to use or share genomic information, 
including an undertaking that they will not attempt to re-
identify genomic material or information, nor permit such 
attempts by others. If researchers share genomic information 
for research, they also are required to make efforts to mini-
mise the potential for re-identification (Australian Govern-
ment National Health and Medical Research Council 2007). 
In addition, the proposed changes under the Privacy Amend-
ment (Re-identification Offence) Bill 2016 (Cth), designed 
to encourage the sharing of useful data, would make it an 
offence for any person to endeavour to re-identify personal 
information published on the basis of de-identification. At 
the time of writing, this Bill is before the Australian Senate 
(the upper house of federal parliament).
Security measures
Security measures for storing and sharing human genome 
information must meet institutional requirements and condi-
tions for approval by reviewing HRECs.
All human genomic research conducted at Australian 
universities and public research institutions must comply 
with the Australian Research Code. Section 1.6 sets out 
responsibilities on researchers to “follow proper practices 
for safety and security” and to maintain primary research 
materials and confidential research data in secure storage. 
Section 2.4 also obligates institutions to ensure the security 
and confidentiality of research data and primary research 
materials, including through developing and instituting poli-
cies for storage and access. Similar broad obligations are 
set out in the National Statement. Paragraph 5.5.5 requires 
that research is conducted in accordance with relevant secu-
rity standards, and that institutions have responsibility for 
monitoring maintenance and security through regular reports 
provided by researchers.
In the case of personal information, additional security 
obligations arise under the Privacy Act. The most relevant 
of the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) included in this 
Act is APP 11.1, which specifies that an entity that holds 
personal information “must take such steps as are reasonable 
in the circumstances to protect the information: from mis-
use, interference, and loss; and from unauthorised access, 
modification, or disclosure”. Notably, the principle may be 
breached even if no unauthorised access or misuse actu-
ally occurs. This raises two key questions in the context of 
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human genomic information falling within the Act’s scope—
when does an entity “hold” the information; and what steps 
are “reasonable” to protect against unauthorised access or 
misuse?
Section 6 of the Privacy Act clarifies that an entity will 
hold personal information if it has possession or control of 
a record that contains the information. The APP Guidelines 
issued by the Office of the Information Commissioner note 
that an entity might “hold” personal information in cir-
cumstances beyond physical possession, including where 
an entity has “the right or power to deal with the personal 
information, even if it does not physically possess or own the 
medium on which the personal information is stored” (Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner 2015). This has 
particular pertinence for human genomic information stored 
on the cloud by the third parties (Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner 2013).
In 2018, Australia implemented a Notifiable Data 
Breaches scheme through the Privacy Amendment (Notifi-
able Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth). The scheme applies 
to all agencies and organisations with the existing security 
obligations under the Privacy Act. Notification obligations 
arise when there is unauthorised access to, disclosure of, 
or loss of, personal information and the access, disclosure, 
or loss is likely to result in serious harm to any individuals 
whose personal information is involved.
Compatible processing/adequacy
The Privacy Act has extra-territorial application: through 
section 5B, it extends to any act done or practice engaged 
in outside Australia, by an agency, or by an organisation or 
operator with an Australian link, unless that act or practice is 
required by a foreign law. Section 16C deals with the cross-
border transfer of personal information collected in Aus-
tralia by an Australian entity. Where personal information is 
transferred by an Australian entity to an overseas recipient, 
and that recipient engages in conduct that would breach the 
APPs, the Australian entity will be taken to have engaged in 
the conduct and breached the APPs. APP 8.1 supplements 
s 16C of the Act, by providing that an Australian entity that 
discloses personal information about an individual to an 
overseas recipient, must take reasonable steps to ensure that 
the overseas recipient does not breach the APPs in relation 
to the information. The application of APP 8.1 is subject to 
a number of provisos. In particular, an Australian entity will 
not be required to take steps as required in APP 8.1 where 
it has a reasonable belief that a foreign law will provide an 
individual with protection should information about them 
be disclosed, or where the individual has consented to the 
disclosure after being made aware that APP 8.1 will not 
apply upon giving that consent.
The intention underlying s 16C and APP 8 was to intro-
duce an accountability approach consistent with the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2015). During 2017, 
the federal government undertook a public consultation to 
gauge support for Australian’s participation in the APEC 
Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) System (Austral-
ian Government Attorney-General’s Department 2017). 
The CBPR System “… requires participating businesses 
to develop and implement data privacy policies consistent 
with the APEC Privacy Framework” (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation). The consultation process resulted in a decision 
by the federal government to apply for Australia’s involve-
ment in the system. Involvement will permit certification of 
businesses involved in cross-border data transfers, who are 
compliant with the requirements of the CBPR System.
What is not yet clear is whether Australia’s compli-
ance with the CBPR system will provide adequacy under 
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”). The Privacy Act shares many features with the 
GDPR in the context of protecting the private information 
of individuals (Office of the Australian Information Com-
missioner 2017). However, as a result of differences between 
the two regimes, Australia has yet to receive a ruling that its 
levels of data protection adequately conform with the GDPR, 
leaving the onus on Australian businesses operating in the 
EU to ensure individual compliance, including potentially 
by taking additional measures to meet GDPR requirements 
(de Sousa 2017).
Oversight
In Australia, HRECs provide the principal form of over-
sight for genomic research. The National Statement requires 
HREC approval for all research that is more than low risk.4 
This includes all human genetic research other than research 
on collections of non-identifiable data that carries only neg-
ligible risks to participants. The Privacy Act also requires 
HREC approval of research that may not comply with the 
standards imposed by the APPs (for example, an absence of 
participant consent to the sharing of personal information).
A prevailing question is whether most HRECs have 
adequate expertise to review the ethical aspects of human 
genomic research. Although HRECs are required to include 
members with the “current research experience relevant 
to the applications being reviewed”, there is no specific 
4 The National Statement defines “low risk” as “research in which 
the only foreseeable risk is one of discomforts.” In turn, discomforts 
are explained as including, for example, minor side-effects of medica-
tion, the discomforts relating to measuring blood pressure, and anxi-
ety induced by an interview.
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requirement for members with expertise in genomics. With-
out an effective mechanism for reviewing individual HREC 
membership and processes (Dodds 2002), it is impossible to 
ascertain whether they have sufficient scientific knowledge 
to review the vast array of genomic research projects com-
ing before them. In 2003, Essentially Yours called on the 
NHMRC to develop and implement a quality improvement 
program for HRECs to promote consistent, efficient, and 
accountable review of human genomic research, including 
addressing the need for adequate HREC expertise (Austral-
ian Law Reform Commission 2003). This remains an ongo-
ing concern.
A further challenge is the burden that the review process 
places on Australian researchers as against its concomitant 
benefits. Historically, HRECs were set up by individual 
research institutions, with approval required by each insti-
tution at which the proposed research was to be conducted. 
More recently, there have been moves towards shared 
reviews for multi-site research. New South Wales (NSW) 
was the first state to implement frameworks to support single 
ethical review of studies involving multiple public hospi-
tals (Fraser et al. 2007). Under the NSW process, a single-
certified HREC provides ethics approval for all designated 
sites. A separate governance review—incorporating, for 
example, consideration of the available budget and insurance 
and indemnity arrangements—is required to be conducted 
by each institution before a research project can commence 
at the site (Rush et al. 2017). In 2010, Queensland began to 
implement a process for single ethical review, with other 
states following in 2013 (Western Australia and South Aus-
tralia) and 2015 (Victoria) (White et al. 2016).
These state-based schemes have been accompanied by 
efforts by the NHMRC to facilitate shared reviews at the 
national level. To this end, the National Approach to Single 
Ethical Review of Multi-Centre Research (formerly Har-
monisation of Multi-Centre Ethical Review, HoMER) was 
implemented in 2007 (Johns et al. 2017). A central com-
ponent of this scheme is national certification of partici-
pating institutions and their HRECs based on an independ-
ent assessment by the NHMRC (Australian Government 
National Health and Medical Research Council 2018b). 
Since November 2013, the Australian National Mutual 
Acceptance (NMA) Scheme has allowed certified HRECs 
to provide a single ethical review for multi-centre clinical 
trials conducted in public hospitals in certain states (ini-
tially Victoria, South Australia, Queensland and New South 
Wales, with Western Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory joining more recently) (Australian Government 
National Health and Medical Research Council 2018c). In 
December 2015, the scope of the Scheme was expanded to 
include all multi-centre human research proposals.
These moves towards a single ethical review proce-
dure promise a lessening of duplication and—through 
certification processes—greater quality assurance for ethi-
cal review of research seeking to share genomic information 
and samples. Nevertheless, gaps remain. Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory are not yet participants in the Australian 
NMA. Moreover, only full ethics applications are included 
in the NMA’s remit: the Scheme does not apply to low and 
negligible risk research, which may include some research 
using de-identified genomic information (Australian Gov-
ernment National Health and Medical Research Council 
2018b). Importantly, in most states, private hospitals are 
not included in NMA single ethical review systems (White 
et al. 2016). Even when research projects are eligible for 
single ethical review, site-specific governance processes can 
impose considerable financial and time costs.
Challenges in implementation of streamlined ethics 
review in Australia are illustrated by the experiences of the 
Australian Pancreatic Cancer Genome Initiative (“APGI”), a 
research network aimed at cataloguing genomic abnormali-
ties in pancreatic cancer patients through next-generation 
sequencing. The network recruited over 700 patients to its 
study between 2009 and 2013, requiring applications to 13 
separate HRECs. Eight HRECs (61%) required a new project 
submission for full review, while five opted for expedited 
review based on prior approvals. Eight (61%) accepted the 
application using the NHMRC standard form, while the 
remainder required a customised form. The time taken to 
complete all submissions, including revisions and further 
communication, amounted to 74.5 working days, with an 
estimated overall cost of $60,471 (Johns et al. 2017). Other 
studies report similar experiences (De Smit et al. 2016; 
White et al. 2016; Rush et al. 2017).
Future directions
Essentially Yours, completed in 2003, placed Australia as 
an early leader in the protection of human genetic informa-
tion (Australian Law Reform Commission 2003). Fifteen 
years later, further work remains to ensure an effective and 
responsive framework for genomic information sharing. A 
promising development is the new revisions to the human 
genomics sections of the National Statement (Australian 
Government National Health and Medical Research Council 
2007). The changes provide more specific and technologi-
cally aware advice to researchers seeking to share genomic 
information, including: obligations to minimise the potential 
for future re-identification; guidance on potential return of 
research findings; requirements for ethical review of trans-
fer agreements for sharing genomic information. The next 
step will be ensuring the capacity of HRECs and others to 
implement the revisions, along with a streamlining of the 
oversight system more generally to ensure that single ethical 
review delivers net benefits.
590 Human Genetics (2018) 137:583–591
1 3
The extensive and typically cross-border sharing arrange-
ments that characterise modern genomic research also war-
rant an assessment of the interactions between multiple, 
often overlapping, legal regimes. An example here is the 
plethora of privacy laws which will govern some, but not all, 
sharing of genomic information depending on its degree of 
identifiability, whether the sharing involves public or private 
actors or some combination of the two, and the Austral-
ian states or territories in which the sharing is taking place. 
Questions also remain about the conditions under which 
HRECs should approve unspecified consent and waivers of 
consent for the sharing of genomic information, particularly 
as the amount of information available through, for exam-
ple, whole-genome and whole-exome sequences allows for 
ever-greater inferences about personal, familial, and group 
characteristics.
Unanswered questions also remain in relation to public 
trust, especially for cross-border sharing and consent waiv-
ers. Public trust is a paramount consideration in maintaining 
Australians’ willingness to donate genomic information and 
participate in medical research (Critchley and Nicol 2017). 
Empirical research is only just beginning to shed light on 
preferences with regard to consent (Garrison et al. 2016), 
data storage (Sanderson et al. 2016), and sharing genetic 
information (Critchley et al. 2015). This work is, however, 
largely descriptive, unintegrated, and lacking examination 
of variation in views across jurisdictions. Unsurprisingly, 
findings are inconsistent: some indicate support for broad 
consent (Tomlinson et al. 2015) and data sharing (McGuire 
et al. 2011) to enable scientific discovery; others suggest the 
opposite, due to concerns about privacy breaches, for-profit 
exploitation and loss of control over how information may 
be used (Aitken et al. 2016).
There is a need to assess the impact of variation in con-
textual factors on public views of consent and cross-border 
data sharing (e.g., differences in privacy laws, ethical over-
sight, and the extent of public and private involvement). 
Recent work suggests the possibility that broad consent and 
waivers may be acceptable in jurisdictions with strong pri-
vacy protection and ethical oversight, in combination with 
strong trust in institutions and researchers (Critchley et al. 
2017). Future research is needed to examine if, and under 
what conditions, Australians would accept consent waivers 
within the context of an understanding of the specific chal-
lenges facing genomic research and an awareness of Austral-
ian privacy and other protections.
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